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Abstract
Chartist and fundamentalist models have proven to be capable of
replicating stylized facts on speculative markets. In general, this is
achieved by specifying nonlinear interactions of otherwise linear as-
set price expectations of the respective trader groups. This paper
investigates whether or not regressive and extrapolative expectations
themselves exhibit signicant nonlinear dynamics. The empirical re-
sults are based on a new data set from the European Central Bank
Survey of Professional Forecasters on oil price expectations. In par-
ticular, we nd that forecasters form destabilizing expectations in the
neighborhood of the fundamental value, whereas expectations tend to
be stabilizing in the presence of substantial oil price misalignment.
JEL classication: F31, D84, C33
Keywords: agent based models, nonlinear expectations, survey data
Address:
 Corresponding author: Stefan Reitz
a Institute for Quantitative Business and Economics Research, University
of Kiel, Heinrich-Hecht-Platz 8, D-24118 Kiel, Germany, Tel.:+49-431-8814-
284, Email: stefan.reitz@qber.uni-kiel.de
b Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Germany.
c Department of Economics, WHU { Otto Beisheim School of Management
d Europa Universit at Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany.
We would like to thank the Euro Area Macroeconomic Development Division of the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB) for providing the data. We are grateful to Andres Gonz alez
and Marcelo Sanchez for helpful comments and discussions. Moreover, we are indebted to
the editor, Cars Hommes, and three anonymous referees for their constructive advice. All
remaining errors and omissions are, of course, the sole responsibility of the authors.1
1 Introduction
Understanding how agents form expectations is at the center of an ongoing
discussion in the literature whether or not the trading behavior in spec-
ulative markets destabilizes market prices. Based on the perception that
models with representative agents frequently failed to predict or even to
explain market behavior, researchers increasingly depart from the underlying
assumption of rational expectations. Motivated by the seminal survey study
of Taylor and Allen (1992), the introduction of heterogenous expectations
has proven to be a powerful tool to replicate properties of trading behavior in
nancial markets (Hommes, 2009; Hommes and Wagener, 2009; Westerho,
2009). The bulk of heterogeneous expectation approaches introduces a
nonlinear law of motion governing agents' switching between otherwise
linear forecasting techniques (Brock and Hommes, 1997; De Grauwe and
Grimaldi, 2006; Lux, 1998; Westerho, 2003). Of course, the introduction
of a nonlinear switching function in an otherwise standard linear framework
is a promising strategy as it enhances the model's explanatory power and
generality (Hommes, 2006; LeBaron, 2006; Lux, 2006). From an empirical
perspective, however, it might be the case that in real world speculative
markets forecasters' expectations themselves exhibit substantial nonlineari-
ties: Market participants most likely observe that asset prices are inherently
nonlinear. For example, it is often found that asset prices tend to be unstable
within the neighborhood of its equilibrium value, but exhibit mean reversion
in the case of substantial misalignment (Reitz and Slopek, 2009). As a result,
asset price forecasts cannot be modeled in a standard unconditional fashion.1
Given that state dependence of traders' expectations could be an important
aspect of asset price dynamics, we provide empirical evidence of nonlinear
1For example, Bauer et al. (2009) show that in the presence of a target zone, traders'
conditional forecasts introduce an additional stabilizing nonlinear component into ex-
change rate dynamics.2
expectation dynamics using survey data from the European Central Bank
(ECB).2 Survey data constitute an important data source for observing
expectation heterogeneity and social interaction among market participants.
For example, Menkho et al. (2009) nd that misalignments of the exchange
rate and exchange rate changes explain expectation heterogeneity in the
foreign exchange market. Lux (2009) reports strong indication of social
interaction as an important element in respondents' assessment of the
German ZEW business climate index. Traditionally, survey data has been
used to analyze how market participants form expectations in nancial
markets. Taylor and Allen (1992), Ito (1990) and Menkho (1997) analyze
short-run and long-run foreign exchange rate forecasts. While short-run
expectations show bandwagon behavior, long-run exchange rate forecasts
exhibit a stabilizing feature.
The empirical analysis is based on a recently released disaggregated data
set of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) on oil prices conducted
on a quarterly basis by the ECB. To investigate possible expectation non-
linearities, we look at oil price forecasts' state dependent reaction to recent
oil price changes and current oil price misalignments. Estimating a panel
smooth transition regression (Panel STR) model proposed by Gonz alez et
al. (2005), we nd that, in the neighborhood of the fundamental value, oil
price forecasters expect the prevailing misalignment to grow in the future.
However, the expected change of the oil price is a (nonlinear) decreasing
function of the dierence between the current oil price and its fundamental
value. Above a certain threshold of the misalignment, the oil price is
expected to revert substantially. By revealing forecasters' perception of
locally unstable but globally stable price dynamics, the analysis establishes
2Earlier contribution such as Taylor and Allen (1992) and Cheung and Chinn (2001)
provide strong motivation for the development of heterogeneous expectation models, but
did not investigate possible expectation nonlinearities.3
the existence of a complex and realistic expectation formation process. This
is an important (and encouraging) result for the chartist and fundamentalist
modeling approach.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we
discuss the oil market and the related literature. Section 3 describes the data
set while section 4 examines various ways to determine a fundamental value
of the oil price. In section 5, we attempt to determine whether expectations
are formed rationally. Specically, we test whether forecasts fulll the
rationality conditions of unbiasedness and orthogonality. While section 6
examines oil price forecasts applying a non-linear Panel-STR framework,
section 7 reports the estimation results. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 The Oil Market and Related Literature
Between 2002 and mid-2008, the oil price increased tremendously from
US$ 20 per barrel to an all-time high of US$ 145 per barrel in July
2008. This oil price shock hit the oil importing nations heavily, and
some economists regard this as one cause for the current worldwide
recession. In turn, the sharp drop of the oil price down to US$ 30 per
barrel in December 2008 has implied a heavy burden on oil exporting
nations such as Russia or Saudi Arabia, which have experienced a severe
deterioration in their terms of trade. These oil price movements were
unforeseen by many economists (Brown et al., 2008). However, recently
the oil price recovered to a level of about US$ 98 per barrel (December 2011).
The upward pressure on oil prices has occasionally been blamed in part
on the inuence of speculation (e.g. Greenspan, 2004) with some analysts
believing that the all-time high was the direct result of a speculative bubble.4
Based on data on the composition of open interest in crude oil markets
published by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
speculative activity would be expected to occur mainly in futures markets
such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange or New York Mercantile Exchange.
In fact, recently published data from the CFTC suggest that swap traders,
hedge funds, and commodity trading advisors account for a major share of
open positions. In addition, there is evidence from empirical studies that
the oil market is frequently subject to bubbles which drive the oil price
away from its equilibrium level. One such study by Reitz and Slopek (2009)
nds that the interaction of chartists and fundamentalists on oil markets
may account for substantial and persistent misalignments in oil prices.
However, the nonlinear dynamics of oil price expectations necessary for
price dynamics such as those recently observed have been taken for granted
or are inferred from oil prices themselves. Since speculative trading is based
solely on market participants' forecasts, an understanding of expectation for-
mation is crucial for assessing its role in price determination in the oil market.
Regarding oil price expectations, MacDonald and Marsh (1993) examine the
eciency of forecasts published in the Consensus Economic Forecast poll.
For the sample period between October 1989 and March 1991, they show
that oil price forecasters form stabilizing expectations, but provide biased
and inecient projections. However, their analysis is limited to 18 months
whereas our analysis covers a period of nearly eight years. Prat and Uctum
(2011) also use oil price expectations of the Consensus Economic Forecast
poll for a three-month and a twelve-month horizon over the period November
1989 { December 2008. They nd that the rational expectations hypothesis
is rejected and that none of the extrapolative, regressive, or adaptive
processes ts the data. Instead, they rather suggest a mixed expectations
model, dened as a linear combination of these traditional processes which
was interpreted as the aggregation of individual mixing behavior and of het-5
erogenous groups of agents using simple processes. However, their analysis is
restricted to the time dimension, because they only have access to the mean
forecast of the aggregated survey data and not to person-specic forecasts.
This yields only a number of 75 forecasts for the three-month forecast and
18 observations for the twelve-month forecast. In contrast, our analysis uses
disaggregated data covering about 800 observations which allows for a de-
tailed analysis of the time and cross-section dimension among the forecasters.
Another strand of the literature on oil price forecasts uses oil price futures
to analyze the expectation forming process in the oil market. Abosedraa
and Baghestani (2004) evaluate the predictive accuracy of crude oil futures
prices for dierent time horizons over the time period 1991 to 2001. They
construct a naive forecasting model to generate comparable forecasts as
benchmarks. However, only the one-month and twelve-months ahead futures
prices outperform the naive random walk suggesting their limited usefulness
as predictors for future realizations. Knetsch (2007) supports this view and
shows that an oil price forecasting technique which is based on the present
value model of rational commodity pricing outperforms futures prices. The
author proposes a forecasting technique which is based on the marginal
convenience yield derived by the cost-of-carry relationship. However, this
technique was also unable to improve forecast accuracy compared to the
random walk.
3 The Data Set
We use the disaggregated data set of the SPF conducted by the ECB on a
quarterly basis.3 Since the ECB has released the SPF just recently, only
3Garcia (2003) describes the SPF data set which is accessible and explained in more
detail on the webpage: www.ecb.int/stats/spf.6
very few studies have used the SPF and none of these studies used the oil
price forecasts. Garcia and Manzanares (2007) and Bowles et al. (2009)
analyze the forecast accuracy of the forecasters in the SPF. They nd that
individual point predictions for the ination rate and the real growth rate
tend to be biased towards favorable outcomes, i.e. forecasters overpredict
growth and underpredict ination rates, which is in line with the study of
Elliott et al. (2008).
The SPF poll started in 2002Q1 and we have access to survey data until
2010Q4. Data to construct the fundamental value of the oil price is limited
to 2009Q4. As a consequence the main part of our study will cover the
time span 2002Q1 { 2009Q4, covering a total of 32 quarters. While a total
of 94 forecasters participated in the survey who provide about 1;400 oil
price forecasts, we only included forecasters who have participated in all
polls. This applies to 25 forecasters and yields 800 oil price forecasts.4 The
participants are professional economists working with nancial institutions
such as international economic research institutes, investment and commer-
cial banks. The ECB asks professional economists in the euro area at the
beginning of each quarter to forecast the oil price and publishes the results
within the next two weeks. A great advantage of the SPF is that it provides
oil price forecasts for the end of the consecutive ve quarters ahead. Hence,
forecasters are requested to predict the oil price for ve dierent forecast
horizons, which allows us to analyze the expectation formation process in an
detailed fashion. Crude oil prices (West Texas Intermediate) from the rst
trading day of the respective quarter are provided by Thomson Datastream.
4The unbalanced and the balanced data set show a similar mean, standard deviation
and forecast performance which might be due to the fact that the ECB does not select the
forecasters based in their track record. Hence, an occasion when a participant does not
respond to the survey is actually random which should mitigate the selection bias of the
balanced data set. More information on the unbalanced data as well as for each forecaster
is available upon request.7
Table 1 reports the main features of the data set. While the actual oil price
over the sample period is US$ 58 per barrel, the forecasters expect the oil
price to decrease with the lowest value of the average four-quarter-ahead
forecast.
{ Insert Table 1 here {
The analysis of oil price expectations is especially appealing since the oil
market has recently shown substantial swings. Figure 1 compares the actual
oil price (solid line) to the mean of the lagged oil price forecasts (dotted
lines). Hence, the vertical dierence between the actual oil price and the
one- (ve-) quarter-ahead forecast is the forecast error. Figure 1 shows that
the forecast error is positive for the period before 2008Q3, which implies that
forecasters { on average { expected a lower oil price than the actual oil price.
The next section investigates how various measures of the fundamental oil
price are constructed.
{ Insert Figure 1 here {
4 Fundamental Value of the Oil Price
When building expectations about future changes of the oil price forecasters
consider some kind of fair value to which the market price is believed to
converge over time. Of course, there is little reason to believe that an
easily observable fundamental value exists in which every forecaster agrees
upon. Since the estimation results may be driven by the choice of the
fundamental value we run the subsequent regressions on the basis of a simple
and a more sophisticated fundamental variable. The simple fundamental8
value boils down to the calculation of a sixteen quarters moving average
and reects the fact that most traders on speculative markets use it as
a benchmark (Ito, 1990). Particularly in real world nancial markets,
where buy or sell decision often have to be made within seconds traders
often adhere to a set of moving averages in order to derive their trading rules.5
In contrast to simple moving averages forecasters may consider a fundamen-
tal value, which is more closely related to oil market variables. In fact, there
exists a large number of potential candidates to explain persistent swings
in the evolution of the oil price. Hamilton (2009), however, argues that
the global demand for oil, especially from China, is the key determinant
among a host of others, such as commodity price speculation, time delays
or geological limitations on increasing production, OPEC monopoly pricing,
and an increasingly important contribution of the scarcity rent. He therefore
concludes that the strong growth in demand from China has substantially
driven the oil price in the last decade. This view is supported by Hicks and
Kilian (2009), who nd that news about global demand presages much of
the surge in the oil prices from mid-2003 until mid-2008 and much of its
subsequent decline. Their measure of global demand shocks is based on
revisions of professional real growth forecasts. In particular, Hicks and Kilian
(2009) show that forecast revisions were associated with a hump-shaped
response of the oil price.
Using oil demand to approximate the fundamental value of the oil price is,
to some extent, in contrast to the common belief that political events such
as wars or embargoes are the main forces driving the oil price. However,
Barsky and Kilian (2004) argue that such exogenous shocks are only one
of a number of dierent determinants of oil prices and their impact may
5Ter Ellen and Zwinkels (2010) made use of moving averages to approximate traders'
perception of the fundamental value in an agent based model of the oil market.9
dier substantially from one episode to another in an unsystematic way.
Beyond the fact that orthogonal oil supply shocks may not distort oil price
regressions, the authors stress that political disturbances do not necessarily
cause oil prices to surge and major oil price increases may occur in the
absence of such shocks. The small impact of oil production shortfalls on
oil prices is conrmed in great detail in Kilian (2008) highlighting the
dominance of alternative driving forces such as persistent shifts in the
demand for oil.
Although there is now little doubt that persistent shifts in the excess
demand for oil are the major fundamental driving force of the past decade's
oil prices, the important question remains as to which variable should be
used to capture demand dynamics. We include the following oil market
candidates as long-run driving forces of the fundamental value. First, we
divided global consumption of crude oil by non-OPEC crude oil production.
Yet, the variable accounts for the fact that global demand has remained
strong overall non-OPEC production growth has slowed. This imbalance
increases reliance upon OPEC production and/or inventories to ll the gap
(OPECreliance). A second variable as a proxy for diminishing excess capacity
or, more generally, market tightness is proposed by Andersen (2005). The
author suggests that Chinese oil imports (IMP China) account for a major
share of world excess demand for oil and is strongly correlated with excess
demand from other important emerging countries, thereby exerting upward
price pressure due to increasing demand. Finally, a more forward-looking
measure of market tightness comprises the ratio of world oil reserves to daily
world oil consumption (Reserves) and gives the number of remaining days
before oil resources are expected to be depleted.
World oil consumption, production and reserves were provided by the Energy
Information Administration, while Chinese imports of oil are taken from the10
OECD Annual Statistical Bulletin (2009). Yearly data are interpolated to
a quarterly frequency assuming an I(1)-process. Crude oil prices (WTI)
from the rst trading day of the respective quarter are provided by Thomson
Financial, Datastream. The data set comprises the period from 1986 to 2009.
The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests represented in Table 2
suggest non-stationarity of the oil price and the above excess demand funda-
mentals.
{ Insert Table 2 {
We follow the Johansen procedure (Johansen, 1991; Johansen and Juselius,
1994) to test for cointegration of the oil price and the dierent demand vari-
ables. First, the unrestricted VAR models are estimated including two lags
as suggested by the Schwarz information criteria. Second, trace statistics
are calculated to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration. When inves-
tigating the relationships between OPECreliance, IMP China, and Reserves
we nd that the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected at
standard levels. The trace statistic of TR = 30:20 does not exceed its 5 per-
cent critical value of TR = 35:19. This implies that potential cointegration
relationships among fundamental can be ruled out. Adding the spot oil price
to the system leads to the rejection of the null in favor of one cointegrating
equation.6 Based on the results of these cointegration tests we assume that
forecasters calculate the fundamental value regressing the spot oil price on
the demand variables:




t + 3Reservest + ut: (1)
Given that forecasters can only rely on data available at time t the regression
is updated every quarter and estimated coecients are used to calculate the
time t fundamental value.7 The rst regression uses data ranging from 1986
6Trace statistic TR = 48:03 exceeds its critical value of TR = 47:86.
7Note that the indices refer to the forecasters' information set. In fact, since forecasts
are made at the beginning of a quarter data on fundamentals are used up to the preceding
quarter.11
to 2001.
Figure 2 shows the demand fundamental (dotted line), the moving average
fundamental (dashed line) and the actual oil price (solid line). Until
2006 the oil price uctuated around the fundamental value before subse-
quently starting to increase substantially. For the period between 2006
and 2008, Figure 2 provides anecdotal evidence that the oil price tends
to move back to the fundamental value after its sharp rise. Hence, the
application of the fundamental value based demand variables as suggested
by Hamilton (2009) seems to t the actual behavior of the oil price quite well.
{ Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 here {
5 Tests for Rationality of Expectations
To examine the question of whether expectations are formed rationally, we
follow Ito (1990), MacDonald and Marsh (1996), and Elliot and Ito (1999)
in applying two criteria: unbiasedness and orthogonality.
5.1 Unbiasedness
To investigate whether oil price forecasts represent unbiased predictors of
future oil price changes, we estimate the following relationship:
st+h   st = h + h(Et;i[st+h]   st) + t+h;i (2)
where st+h   st is the change in the oil price and Et;i[st+h]   st is the
expected change by forecaster i at time t. Unbiasedness prevails if h = 0
and h = 1. Note that in this case oil price changes are not necessarily fore-
casted accurately but the forecast errors do not show any systematic pattern.12
In a rst step, we estimated equation (2) by OLS (results not presented)
but realized that cross-section autocorrelation is a serious problem. Market
wide shocks and new information that occur between the expectations were
set in period t and the oil price materialize in period t + h will inuence the
forecasting success of all forecasters in the same direction. As a consequence
standard errors would be biased downwards. As a consequence, we corrected
for the cross-section autocorrelation and standard errors increased by a
factor of about 3. This indicates the severeness of this bias in variability
when estimating just with OLS.
The results { summarized in Table 3 { indicate that the ^ h coecient de-
creases as the forecast horizon increases. Since the constant (i.e., ^ h) is
signicantly dierent from zero and, except for the one-quarter-ahead fore-
cast, the ^ h coecient is dierent from unity, the oil price expectations are
not an unbiased predictor of the future development.
{ Insert Table 3 here {
5.2 Orthogonality
We now turn to the test of orthogonality. It stipulates the question whether
or not forecast errors are related to information on oil price changes avail-
able at the time of the forecast. As a representation for the latter we use two
arguments, namely the previous oil price change (st st 1) as well as the dif-
ference between the actual oil price level and its demand-based fundamental
value (st   ft). To test the orthogonality condition of oil price forecasts, we
estimate:
st+h   Et;i[st+h] = h + h(st   st 1) + h(st   ft) + t+h;i (3)
Orthogonality implies that h = h = h = 0 so that neither the constant
term nor any other available information explains the forecast error. We used13
time xed eects to control for systematic cross-section autocorrelation due
to market wide shocks. Table 4 reports that ^ h takes a signicant negative
value in all but one regressions.
{ Insert Table 4 here {
While the estimated ^ h coecient is signicant for the three forecasts
with the longest forecast horizon, it becomes insignicant for the shorter
forecast horizons. Furthermore, the estimated h-coecient is signicantly
negative for all but one forecast horizons. This implies that forecasters do
not take all the information regarding the previous oil price change and the
misalignment into account when predicting the oil price. In summary, we
nd that oil price forecasts are biased and hence not rational.
6 A Nonlinear Model of Oil Price Expecta-
tions
The literature on the chartist and fundamentalist approach extensively
showed that time series properties of nancial market prices can be re-
produced by the nonlinear interaction of linear forecasting techniques.8
To ensure global stability of the price path, it is generally assumed that
market participants increasingly switch to stabilizing expectations as the
misalignments grow. This is motivated by the nding in survey studies
(Taylor and Allen, 1992; Menkho, 1997) that the fraction of forecasters
building regressive expectations goes up as the forecast horizon increases. If
market participants observe that asset prices tend to be unstable within the
neighborhood of its equilibrium value and exhibit stronger mean reversion
in the case of substantial misalignment they may adjust their forecasts
accordingly. This state dependence of expectations is not necessarily
8See the surveys by LeBaron (2006) and Hommes (2006).14
conned to regressive expectations, but may also appear within the category
of extrapolative expectations. Thus, it seems reasonable to presume
that traders' expectations, regressive or extrapolative, exhibit substantial
nonlinearities.
6.1 The Panel-STR model
In the following we apply the Panel-STR methodology to provide empirical
evidence on the potentially nonlinear behavior of oil price expectations. The
Panel-STR model was introduced by Gonz alez et al. (2005) to account for
smooth and gradual transition of a system between two or more regimes:9
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where yt;i is the endogeneous variable, xi;t is the vector of exogenous variables
and !j(q
j
t;j;j) is one of r transition functions, each bounded between 0
and 1, q
j
t the threshold variable, j the transition speed and j the threshold
parameter. We follow Gonz alez et al. (2005) and use a logistic specication











Equation (4) together with equation (5) constitute a quite exible gener-
alization of the standard two-regime Panel-STR model. Since the vector
of regressors contains both the current misalignment as well as the recent
change of the oil price the model simultaneously deals with regressive and
extrapolative expectations. As argued earlier each forecasting strategy may
be performed conditional on a set of threshold variables. Although there is
9The Panel-STR model has been applied to exchange rates by B ereau et al. (2008).15
a wide range of possible candidates inuencing the current stance of fore-
casters' expectations,10 we restrict our choice to the current misalignment
and the recent return. This reects the fact that in contrast to speculators
forecasters may be less concerned about the performance of particular
trading strategies, but try to identify whether or not current trends are
lasting. This boils down to investigating whether forecasters have learned
how oil prices behave in dierent market environments. Thus, our model
should allow for both regressive expectations and extrapolative expectations
to be driven by the current misalignment and the recent price return. The
modeling procedure for building Panel-STR models is carried out in three
steps according to Gonz alez et al. (2005): (i) specication, (ii) estimation,
and (iii) evaluation.
6.2 Model Specication
The important task in the specication step is the identication of a possible
nonlinear relationship between the endogenous and exogenous variables. To
this end, we test linearity against the STR model using the threshold vari-
ables (st   ft) and (st   st 1).11 Testing the null hypothesis H0 : j = 0
to identify the role of a nonlinear component, however, is not straightfor-
ward. Under the null, there are unidentied nuisance parameters implying
that a simple t-test is not applicable. To circumvent this problem we follow
Luukkonen et al. (1988) and replace the transition function by its rst-order
Taylor expansion. In the resulting auxiliary regression:
yt;i = i + 
0
0 xi;t + 
0




i;t + i;t (6)
10Empirical agent based models such as Boswijk et al. (2007) and Ter Ellen and Zwinkels
(2010) rely on recent prots or mean squared errors of the respective trading strategy to
map the switching of speculators.
11Using these two terms to analyze the actual law of motion of the oil price yields
evidence of regressive as well as extrapolative features in the actual oil price development.
The results are available upon request.16




m are multiples of  implying that rejection
of 
0
1 = ::: = 
0
m = 0 is taken as evidence in favor of nonlinearity. The related
LM-test statistic is derived in Gonz alez et al. (2005).
{ Insert Table 5 here {
The results represented in Table 5 show that, in general, the linear model
is strongly rejected in favor of STR-type nonlinearity. When looking at
the results of the full sample regressions the following details are worth
mentioning: First, the highest 2-statistics occur when the regressor
variable is combined with the same transition variable. This suggests that
extrapolative expectations exhibit nonlinearities with respect to recent
returns, while regressive expectation are inuenced by the current value of
misalignment. Of course, regressive expectations also seem to be driven by
the latest observable return, which points to a cross combination of regressor
and transition variable. Extensive experimentation, however, revealed that
additional consideration of cross variable specications quite often led to
non-convergence of the estimation routine. This might be due to the fact
that higher order terms in the Taylor expansion are strongly correlated.
In order to ensure comparability among the dierent combinations of
forecasting horizon and fundamental variable, we opt for a specication
without any cross variable terms.
Second, when considering the fundamental value based on our proxy vari-
ables for oil demand the identication tests produce comparable results.12
Third, it might be suspected that the revealed nonlinearities are due to the
oil price bubble starting in 2007. Although bubble episodes should not ex
ante be excluded from the regressions, the relatively short sample available
for estimation might lead to an over-representation of bubble-observations
12Cross variable combinations of misalignment and recent return produce higher test
statistics only for short-run forecasts of one month.17
and biased test results. Consequently, we performed sub-sample robustness
checks to assess the impact of the post-2007 oil price bubble. The results in
Table 5 conrm that linearity is rejected in favor of STR-type nonlinearities
even in o-bubble periods.
6.3 Model Estimation
As outlined in Gonz alez et al. (2005) these regressions can be used to deter-
mine the order of inhomogeneity m in equation (5). The test results suggest
no common order of inhomogeneity over the entire range of forecasting hori-
zons and dierent fundamental values. Moreover, the recommended func-
tional forms do not necessarily ensure convergence of the estimation routine.
As a result of extensive experimentation we nd that a robust solution to this
problem is a logistic transformation of the absolute value of the transition









ensures that !t remains in the interval between 0 and 1.13
The PSTR model is a xed eects model with exogenous regressors. Param-
eter estimates are obtained applying nonlinear least squares after demeaning
the data. It should be noticed that unlike standard linear models, variable
means depend on the parameters in the transition functions. Consequently,
demeaned values are recomputed at each iteration of the estimation routine
(Gonz alez et al., 2005). The prevailing nonlinear mean reversion and extrapo-
lation functions can each be reproduced with two dierent sets of coecients.
Thus, the nonlinear estimation routine is sensitive to the sign of the start-
13An exponential transition function of the form 1   exp( jjq
j
t   jj) produces com-
parable results.18
ing value of -parameters. We set each starting value to 0.5.14 Moreover,







t Xituit) as the center term in the sandwich es-
timator where Xit and uit are the observations and error terms for forecaster
i at time t.
6.4 Model Evaluation
To evaluate the estimated P-STR model we consider two specication tests.
Specically, Gonz alez et al. (2005) suggest an adaption of the tests of pa-
rameter constancy (PC) over time and of no remaining nonlinearity (NRNL)
as developed in Eitrheim and Ter asvirta (1996) for univariate STAR mod-
els. Both tests are performed in the way described in section 6.2. First, the
estimated model is extended by the terms of a Taylor expansion represent-
ing additional nonlinearities (NRNL) or nonlinear time dependence of model
coecients (PC). The according LM-type test statistic has an asymptotic
F-distribution. In the case of the NRNL-test we consider the same tran-
sition variables as used in the Panel-STR model, while in the case of the
parameter constancy test powers of a time trend are included. By doing
so the NRNL-test checks whether the Panel-STR model has fully captured
the identied expectation nonlinearities and the parameter constancy test
reveals any structural breaks in the sample. The latter is particularly impor-
tant given that a signicant fraction of our observations stem from a bubble
episode.
7 Empirical Results
The empirical model of oil price expectations has been applied to ve dierent
forecasting horizons using two dierent fundamental values. As outlined
before the simple moving average as well as the more sophisticated excess
14Starting values of all other coecients are set to zero.19
demand variable are calculated to specify regressive expectations. Extra-
polative expectations refer to the recent oil price return.
7.1 Underlying Fundamental: Excess Oil Demand
Table 6 contains our nal estimation results applying the excess demand
variable as the fundamental value. The estimated coecients are statisti-
cally signicant in all cases. When looking at the shift parameters  in the
transition function we nd that, in the case of extrapolative expectations,
the estimated values remain largely unchanged over dierent forecasting
horizons. The estimation routine investigating four and ve quarters
ahead forecasts did not converge, so we decided to set the  parameter
to the estimated value of the preceding models. In the case of regressive
expectations the shift parameter increases in absolute terms indicating
that longer run forecasts may reect fundamentals to a lower extent than
the current value suggests. The coecient  determining the curvature
of the transition function increases for both regressive expectations and
extrapolative expectations pointing to a faster transition between 0 and 1
as the forecasting horizon increases. The estimated 0s and 1s suggest the
following interesting interpretations.
First, in the case of extrapolative expectations, the previous results are con-
rmed. The forecasts in the ECB survey seem to exhibit contrarian behavior
as an observed oil price increase is expected to be reverted in the future. The
extent to which this return reversion is expected to occur depends on the ab-
solute value of the oil price return. As can be observed in Figure 3 smaller
returns are expected to be unwinded quite immediately, whereas larger re-
turns are expected to be more persistent. Returns exceeding a threshold of
about twenty percent are not expected to be reverted at all. Obviously, the
nature of extrapolative expectations switches from contrarian to bandwagon20
behavior.
{ Insert Table 6 and Figure 3 here {
Second, in the case of regressive expectations the linear term 0 is signif-
icantly positive. This implies that, in general, forecasters' expectations
tend to be destabilizing as a given misalignment is expected to be inated
by future increases of the oil price. The negative coecient 1 together
with the specied transition function, however, shows that the expected
destabilization is reduced with rising misalignment. Forecasters using the
excess demand variable seem to interpret small deviations of the actual oil
price from its fundamental value as a signal for a stronger misalignment in
the future, while large deviations are expected to be reverted. This type
of nonlinearity in expectations is robust with respect to the entire set of
forecasting horizons.
{ Insert Figure 4 {
When comparing the expected mean reversions in Figure 4 we nd that the
transition function is shifted downwards slightly as the forecasting horizon
increases. Short-run forecasts exhibit stabilizing expectations only in the
presence of larger misalignments, while long-run forecasts imply signicant
mean reversion also for smaller deviation of the oil price from its fundamental
value. Put dierently, market participants seem to believe that misalign-
ments are inated in the short run, but will be eliminated thereafter. Of
course, very small (negative) misalignments are not expected to be corrected
at all. All in all these results are consistent with the view that forecasters be-
lieve oil prices to exhibit enduring misalignments, but remain globally stable.
If we interpret the above setup as a representative agent model where the
average respondent has a nonlinear forecasting function that is explosive21
close to the fundamental value and mean-reverting in the case of substantial
misalignment, we may compare the reported dynamics in expectations with
empirical results of heterogeneous agents models (HAM). For example, in
the HAM of Boswijk et al. (2007) dealing with the U.S. stock market one
trader type has stable mean reverting expectations while the other has un-
stable trend extrapolation expectations. The switching between trader types
depends on the protability of the respective trading techniques in the recent
past. The authors nd that in the case of a rapid increase of stock prices
not accompanied by improvements in the fundamentals losses for fundamen-
talists and prots for trend followers cause evolutionary pressure towards
trend followers, thus reenforcing the trend in prices. In a similar HAM of
the oil market Ter Ellen and Zwinkels (2010) assume prices to be deter-
mined by both fundamentalist expectations exerting a stabilizing eect and
chartist expectations introducing a destabilizing inuence on oil price dy-
namics. Because the switching mechanism in this model is based on squared
forecasting errors trends resulting in misalignments tend to be reinforced as
chartist expectations gain weight in the market. Respondents in the sur-
vey of professional forecasters expect large oil price returns to be followed
by returns of the same sign, implying that the nonlinear return dynamics
identied in empirical HAMs seem to be perceived by market participants.
Complementing the above studies, the empirical HAM of Reitz and Slopek
(2009) explicitly focusses on the stabilizing inuence of fundamentalist trad-
ing. While the number of chartist is assumed to be constant over time, the
number of fundamentalists may change in accordance to the recent misalign-
ment. The empirical results reported in Reitz and Slopek (2009) suggest
that fundamentalists gain weight in the oil market as misalignments grow
thereby providing necessary mean reversion to ensure global stability. This
is compatible with the forecasters' view that large misalignments will nally
be eliminated during the course of future trading. While empirical HAMs
show a considerable variety of switching mechanisms, their results regarding22
the time varying stability of asset price dynamics seem to be reected in the
expectations of the ECB oil price forecasters.
7.2 Underlying Fundamental: Moving Average
The fundamental value of the preceding section is based on quite complex
calculations and it might be argued that market participants tend to apply
much simpler measures to approximate an asset price's equilibrium value.
This is emphasized by the fact that standard fundamental models fail to ex-
plain a substantial fraction of asset price variation. In real world nancial
markets, where buy or sell decision often have to be made within seconds,
traders often adhere to a set of moving averages in order to derive their
trading rules. Consequently, researchers in agent based modeling made use
of moving averages to approximate traders's perception of the fundamental
value (Ter Ellen and Zwinkels, 2010). Table 7 contains our nal estima-
tion results applying a sixteen quarters moving average as the fundamental
value.15
{ Insert Table 7 here {
Like in the previous section, the estimated coecients are statistically
signicant in all cases and the model t increases in terms of R
2
as the
forecasting horizon increases. When looking at the shift parameters  in the
transition function we nd that the estimated values remain in the same
range over dierent forecasting horizons. The coecient  determining
the curvature of the transition function also remains in the same range
for the regressive expectations. In the case of extrapolative expectations a
substantial increase of this parameter points to a faster transition between
0 and 1 as the forecasting horizon increases. The estimated 0s and 1s
15As a robustness check, we also experimented with a twelve quarters moving average.
The estimation results remain qualitatively unchanged and are available from the authors
on request.23
suggest the following interpretations.
First, in the case of extrapolative expectations, the linear term 0 is signi-
cantly negative. The forecasts in the ECB survey seem to exhibit contrarian
behavior. A given observed oil price increase is expected to be reverted in
the future. The extent to which this return reversion is expected to occur de-
pends on the absolute value of the oil price return. While smaller returns are
expected to be unwound immediately, larger returns are expected to be more
persistent. Second, in the case of regressive expectations the linear term 0 is
signicantly negative. This implies that, in general, forecasters' expectations
tend to be stabilizing as a given misalignment is expected to be diminished
by future decreases of the oil price. The positive coecient 1 together with
the specied transition function reveals that the expected mean reversion
declines with a rising misalignment. Forecasters using a moving average fun-
damental obviously view strong misalignments to be more persistent than
smaller deviations from the equilibrium value. This somewhat surprising
nding is robust with respect to the entire set of forecasting horizons and
may be interpreted as a result of forecasters' increased precaution regarding
the speed of future mean reversion as misalignments become substantial. A
more technical interpretation of the estimation results is based on the fact
that moving averages are correlated with the actual oil price. An upswing of
the oil price also increases its moving average. The more the moving average
adjusts to current price developments the smaller is the need for future price
changes to close the gap.
7.3 Sub-Sample Results
Due to the fact that the ECB survey of professional forecasters started in
2002 the fraction of forecasts made in the presence of the oil price bubble
is quite large. As a consequence, the results of the paper might be driven24
solely by the huge run-up in oil prices. In particular, the nding that expec-
tations only become stabilizing in the presence of a substantial mispricing is
suspected to be bubble-driven. As a further robustness check we perform a
sub-sample exercise excluding the bubble period starting in 2007. The re-
maining 500 observations are used to estimate a slightly modied Panel-STR
model.16 First, the shift parameters  in the transition functions turned out
be statistically insignicant, so we skipped these coecients from the nal
estimations. Second, squared transition variables dominated absolute values
in terms of convergence of the estimation routine and model t. In the case
of the longer-run forecasts the estimation of coecient  in the transition
functions of extrapolative expectations obviated convergence. We decided
to set  = 153:61 as resulted from two quarters ahead forecasts. Table 8
contains our estimation results.
{ Insert Table 8 here {
The coecients of regressive expectations are statistically signicant and ex-
hibit the same signs as in the full-sample estimation, while the parameters
of extrapolative expectations switched signs. Obviously, the nonlinear prop-
erties of regressive expectations remain qualitatively the same. Regarding
extrapolative expectations, however, we conclude that in o-bubble periods
small returns provoke bandwagon expectations, while large returns result in
contrarian expectations. This is consistent with the idea that in general,
expectations behave globally stable, while in the presence of potential asset
price bubbles forecasters seem to consider a shift in the fundamental value
implying oil price returns to be of permanent nature.
7.4 Model Evaluation
The model explains an increasing fraction of forecasting variability in terms
of R
2
as the forecasting horizon increases. Most likely, the inuence of short-
16The excess demand variables are used to calculate the fundamental value.25
run oil price dynamics due to the impact of new information diminishes as
forecasters have to deal with long-run uctuations. In order to assess to
what extent the nonlinear part in the panel regressions improve the models
explanatory power, we calculate the 2-statistic of the likelihood ratio test
by setting 1 =  =  = 0 in the restricted (linear) model. The one percent
critical value of the 2(6)-statistic is 16.81. Of course, under the null hy-
pothesis of  = 0 there are unidentied nuisance parameters ruling out this
procedure as a rigorous statistical test. The NRNL-test statistics indicate
some remaining nonlinearities.17 Compared to the initial tests against lin-
earity presented in section 6:2, however, the Panel-STR models catch a great
deal of STR-type nonlinearity. Regarding the parameter constancy tests we
nd little room for structural breaks. Although the F-statistics are often sta-
tistically signicant, particularly in case of the moving average fundamental,
no single higher order trend component in the test regression is signicantly
dierent from zero at the ve percent level. Given that the same specication
is applied across all forecast horizons/fundamental value combinations ensur-
ing comparability among the respective alternatives, the Panel-STR model
ts the data reasonably well.
8 Conclusion
This paper investigates oil price expectations of the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the European Central Bank. The data set
allows for disaggregating oil price expectations over a period spanning eight
years. In contrast to earlier linear studies of survey data, we are able to
identify important nonlinear properties of forecasters' expectations. Apply-
ing a Panel-STR model developed by Gonz alez et al. (2005), we nd that the
expected mean reversion of oil prices depends on its current misalignment.
17Re-estimation of the model including higher order terms of the transition variables
did not improve the results.26
The expectations reect the perception of destabilizing oil price dynamics in
neighborhood of the fundamental calculated by means of oil demand vari-
ables, while mean reversion of oil prices is expected to become stabilizing
where substantial misalignments exist. Extrapolative expectations are non-
linear in the sense that smaller returns are expected to be unwinded im-
mediately, while larger returns are perceived to be more persistent. These
expectation dynamics are prevalent regardless of the forecasting horizon in-
vestigated. A sub-sample exercise excluding the oil-price bubble reveals that
the nonlinear dynamics of regressive expectations remain the same. Extrap-
olative expectations exhibit a dierent type of nonlinearity as small returns
seem to provoke bandwagon expectations, while large returns result in con-
trarian forecasts. This clearly indicates that the scope for detailed sub-sample
estimation of nonlinear STR-models in the presence of comparatively short
data sets is limited. In general, however, we are condent that the SPF
forecasters' perception of locally unstable but globally stable price dynam-
ics provides evidence for the existence of a complex expectation formation
process encouraging the introduction of nonlinear expectation in asset price
models. In fact, it would be interesting to see whether forecasters at times
switch between regressive and extrapolative expectations in a predictable
fashion. This is left for future research.27
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Expected Oil Price
Forecast Horizon 1Q Ahead 2Q Ahead 3Q Ahead 4Q Ahead 5Q Ahead Actual
mean 57.01 55.98 55.27 55.08 55.16 58.29
standard deviation 25.83 25.61 25.46 25.47 25.67 26.77
skewness 0.69 0.60 0.51 0.42 0.38 0.65
kurtosis 3.56 3.29 2.99 2.68 2.48 3.51
forecasters 25 25 25 25 25 {
observations 900 900 900 900 900 37
Note: Table 1 shows the average oil price forecast for the end of the respective quarter as
well as the descriptive statistics for the sample period between 2002Q1 and 2010Q4.
Table 2: Unit Root Tests
Fundamental SpotOilPrice OPECreliance IMP China Reserves
ADF -1.53 -1.86 0.33 -1.99
Note: ADF denotes the adjusted Dickey-Fuller test statistic of the unit root test(intercept
included). The respective MacKinnon (1991) ve percent critical value is ADFcrit =
 2:89.32
Table 3: Test of Unbiasedness
1Q Ahead 2Q Ahead 3Q Ahead 4Q Ahead 5Q Ahead
^ unb .0822** .1079** .1480** .1926*** .2169***
(.0330) (.0544) (.0641) (.0686) (.07184)
^ unb 0.8793 0.4912* .4203* .4884* .3926**
(.2503) (.3008) (.3031) (.2888) (.2780)
R2 .1433 .0339 .0286 .0452 .0331
Obs 875 850 825 800 775
Note: The table represents the regression results for the equation st+h   st = h +
h(Et;i[st+h]   st) + t+h;i. Standard error in parentheses; *** (**) and * indicate sig-
nicance at the 1% (5%) and 10% levels of the null hypothesis that ^  = 0 and ^  = 1,
respectively.
Table 4: Test of Orthogonality
1Q Ahead 2Q Ahead 3Q Ahead 4Q Ahead 5Q Ahead
^ ortho -.0592*** .0320 -.2343*** -.0945** -.1703***
(.0155) (.0237) (.0338) (.0405) (.0503)
^ ortho -.0056 .0656 -.5406*** -.2384*** -.1951***
(.0318) (.0468) (.0552) (.0638) (.0574)
^ ortho -.6434*** -.4819*** -.9483*** -.8633*** -.1698
(.0375) (.0523) (.0772) (.0887) (.1232)
R2 .8986 .9252 .9251 .9137 .9056
Obs 800 800 800 800 775
Forecasters 25 25 25 25 25
Note: Regression results for the equation st+h  Et;i[st+h] = h +h(st  st 1)+h(st  
ft) + t+h;i by means of the Newey/West panel estimator; robust autocorrelation and
heteroskedastic standard error in parentheses; *** (**) and * indicate signicance at the
1% (5%) and 10% levels, respectively.33
Table 5: Nonlinearity-Tests
Full sample up to 2006:4
Forecast Regressor Transition MA16 Demand MA16 Demand
1Q mis mis 51.18 12.09 81.55 31.93
mis return 18.57 23.18 14.58 24.29
return mis 2.68 25.29 46.66 32.09
return return 59.29 67.29 15.87 12.69
2Q mis mis 68.43 15.59 80.23 66.58
mis return 16.81 26.13 14.69 49.3
return mis 0.63 6.65 87.89 98.01
return return 37.82 45.9 27.57 18.93
3Q mis mis 82.93 26.94 106.51 95.83
mis return 10.04 21.15 3.48 55.59
return mis 0.37 8.23 124.81 121.7
return return 36.56 43.09 30.63 21.77
4Q mis mis 87.41 36.53 93.59 94.87
mis return 9.44 22.53 3.75 44.77
return mis 1.49 7.46 110.71 114.12
return return 31.62 36.71 40.57 31.09
5Q mis mis 80.9 39.09 90.32 96.49
mis return 10.49 23.69 4.92 47.11
return mis 2.33 7.72 106.05 108.19
return return 23.32 27.95 37.22 28.63
Note: 2-statistics of the linearity tests against STR-type nonlinearities. The one percent
critical value is 2
crit = 11:34. 'mis' indicated the current misalignment (st   ft), and
'return' refers to the recent percentage change of the oil price (st   st 1). Data from
1Q2002 to 4Q2009.34
Table 6: Panel-STR Model with the Demand Fundamental
Expectation Coecient 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 5Q
Regressive 0 2.17 2.16 1.92 2.26 2.35
(0.31) (0.27) (0.15) (0.19) (0.18)
1 -2.24 -2.30 -2.12 -2.53 -2.65
(0.31) (0.27) (0.15) (0.19) (0.18)
 16.65 16.07 30.84 31.07 31.02
(1.14) (1.04) (2.45) (2.58) (2.45)
 -0.06 -0.09 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Extrapolative 0 -0.51 -0.78 -1.00 -1.13 -1.08
(0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
1 0.63 0.93 1.15 1.25 1.16
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
 9.90 13.11 13.84 15.66 15.59
(1.04) (1.35) (1.79) (1.90) (2.22)
 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) ({) ({)
R
2
0.19 0.24 0.35 0.38 0.40
LRT 133.90 156.10 230.76 217.18 189.18
NRNL regressive 9.96 5.62 7.93 7.55 8.32
extrap. 28.09 12.06 11.07 7.34 5.99
PC F(12,763) 2.98 2.16 3.58 2.88 2.68
Note: Regression results for the equation (4) and equation (5); robust standard error in
parentheses; LRT indicates the 2-statistic of the likelihood ratio test setting 1 =  =
 = 0 in the restricted (linear) model. The one percent critical value of the 2(6)-statistic
is 16.81. NRNL is the F-value for no remaining nonlinearity as described in section 6.4;
PC reects the F-statistic of parameter constancy against STR-type time variation. Data
from 1Q2002 to 4Q2009.35
Table 7: Panel-STR Model with the MA Fundamental
Expectation Coecient 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 5Q
Regressive 0 -1.07 -2.04 -2.84 -3.27 -3.44
(0.27) (0.29) (0.38) (0.48) (0.50)
1 1.14 2.06 2.84 3.21 3.35
(0.27) (0.30) (0.39) (0.49) (0.51)
 7.45 8.84 9.01 9.10 9.08
(1.12) (0.68) (0.58) (0.67) (0.70)
 -0.14 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Extrapolative 0 -0.40 -0.55 -0.82 -1.01 -0.91
(0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17)
1 0.46 0.60 0.84 0.99 0.85
(0.06) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16)
 8.03 13.14 18.63 25.17 27.17
(1.30) (2.22) (2.92) (4.68) (6.48)
 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R
2
0.16 0.23 0.32 0.37 0.40
LRT 112.30 146.66 190.46 197.18 188.36
NRNL regressive 2.64 2.85 3.50 5.11 5.05
extrapol. 20.85 10.97 9.52 6.54 5.34
PC F(12,763) 1.38 1.42 2.08 1.71 1.57
Note: Regression results for the equation (4) and equation (5); robust standard error in
parentheses; LRT indicates the 2-statistic of the likelihood ratio test setting 1 =  =
 = 0 in the restricted (linear) model. The one percent critical value of the 2(6)-statistic
is 16.81. NRNL is the F-value for no remaining nonlinearity as described in section 6.4;
PC reects the F-statistic of parameter constancy against STR-type time variation. Data
from 1Q2002 to 4Q2009.36
Table 8: Sub-Sample Estimation Using the Demand Fundamental
Expectation Coecient 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 5Q
Regressive 0 0.84 1.39 1.38 1.54 1.61
(0.08) (0.22) (0.15) (0.18) (0.24)
1 -0.97 -1.49 -1.51 -1.70 -1.80
(0.19) (0.20) (0.15) (0.16) (0.21)
 17.28 28.49 25.17 27.45 28.60
(9.35) (8.50) (7.46) (8.70) (9.49)
Extrapolative 0 0.53 1.05 0.79 0.73 0.79
(0.29) (0.31) (0.21) (0.18) (0.27)
1 -0.81 -1.38 -1.18 -1.14 -1.23
(0.28) (0.31) (0.22) (0.19) (0.27)
 142.41 153.61 153.61 153.61 153.61
(57.80) (35.65) ({) ({) ({)
R
2
0.33 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.34
LRT 41.18 57.96 45.24 43.42 41.80
NRNL regressive 0.11 5.79 12.34 15.67 16.63
extrapol. 0.09 1.46 5.45 8.17 7.00
PC F(12,763) 0.77 1.12 2.56 3.30 3.54
Note: Regression results for the equation (4) and equation (5); robust standard error in
parentheses; LRT indicates the 2-statistic of the likelihood ratio test setting 1 =  = 0
in the restricted (linear) model. The one percent critical value of the 2(6)-statistic is
16.81. NRNL is the F-value for no remaining nonlinearity as described in section 6.4; PC
reects F-statistic of parameter constancy against STR-type time variation. Data from
1Q2002 to 4Q2006.37
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Notes: The (ne) dotted line reects the mean of the one- (ve-) quarter-ahead oil price forecast at the
time of its realization while the solid line shows the actual oil price. The vertical dierence between the
actual oil price and the oil price forecast is therefore the forecast error.
Figure 2: Actual and Fundamental Values of the Oil Price (in US dollar)








Notes: Solid line { actual oil price, dotted line { excess demand fundamental,
dashed line { moving average 16 quarters. Data from 1990 to 2009.38
Figure 3: Transition Functions for Extrapolative Expectations
One Quarter















































Notes: The gures show the expected mean reversion (0 +1!t) on the vertical axis and
the lagged return st   st 1 on the horizontal axis.
Figure 4: Transition Functions for Regressive Expectations
One Quarter






















































Notes: The gures show the expected mean reversion (0 +1!t) on the vertical axis and
the misalignment st   ft on the horizontal axis.